H.A.R.M.S. Links:
Newsletter
(Spring 2001)
As spokesperson for an organization dedicated to crew health and safety, I offer the following observations and suggestions intended to protect crew, our passengers and the public safety.
On September 11, 2001 all of our assumptions about the potential conduct of hijackers and the appropriate crew response changed.
Potential hijackers must be isolated from the cockpit. As long as hijackers think that they can access the cockpit and thus control of an aircraft, aviation will continue to be a target and a potential tool of terrorism.
While cockpit security may never be perfect, the door, locking mechanism and bulkhead that separate the cockpit from the cabin must be redesigned to offer true security to those who pilot all commercial aircraft.
We must consider a new policy of a cockpit "lockdown" in the case of hijacking including a refusal to open the cockpit in response to the threat of an onboard explosive device or violence to cabin crew or passengers.
We need to reconsider the safety implication of having only two crewmembers in the cockpit. The presence of a third crewmember occupying the traditional engineer's seat, offers an additional buffer between the pilots and the cockpit door. The presence of the third pilot /engineer also is an important safety consideration in the case of heart failure or similar health crisis of one of the two pilots.
Armed sky marshals should be expected to be on board most flights.
Both cockpit and cabin crew need to be more extensively trained to deal with terrorists and with unruly passengers. Federal penalties for interference with a crew member should be stiffened and vigorously enforced.
We encourage management and crew to support the investments and changes necessary to maintain a healthy and vigorous aviation environment.
Mardi Crane
Editor, www.healthycrew.org
PO Box 409
Arlington, VT 05250